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LOOKING AT LAW
by Carol Weisbrod*
It is by now widely understood that law can be studied from both
the inside and the outside and that scholarly questions can be legiti-
mately explored from either position.' This discussion concerns re-
search from the outside.
The attempt to look at a thing from the outside seems to require
that the researcher stand mentally, if not physically, someplace else.
The enterprise is aided when the researcher has some clear sense of
where that place is. Where are we standing when we say that we are
looking at law from the outside? There is no single answer, but much
work that looks at law from the outside does so from the standpoint of
a particular discipline or theory. Thus, research is often done from the
viewpoint of economics, anthropology, or sociology. The alternative
mode might be thought to involve a peculiarly personal and even autis-
tic angle of vision. These two are the most obviously available routes by
which an academic lawyer can escape from the constraints of the inside
perspective.' But there is also a way to look at law from the outside
that is broader than either of these and that requires nothing dramatic
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. J.D., Columbia University. Pro-
fessor Weisbrod teaches Contracts, Commercial Law, Family Law, and a seminar on Church and
State.
This article draws on my experiences as a visitor at the University of Exeter in the fall of
1983, under the auspices of the Exeter/Connecticut Exchange Program. It seems appropriate,
therefore, to include it in an issue of the Connecticut Law Review dedicated to Dean Phillip
Blumberg, who encouraged the exchange at every point as part of his broad commitment to the
scholarly enterprise.
1. For discussions of internal and external views of law from the jurisprudential side. see
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 99-107 (1961), and from the social science perspective, see
L. FRIEDMAN & S. MIACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1969). For a discussion of
a particular legal theory that "looks at law from outside law," see L LIPSON, Is There a Marxist
Theory of Law: Comments on Tushnet, in MAytxsMi: Nosios XXCI 189 (J.R. Pennock & J.W.
Chapman eds. 1983).
2. The present discussion assumes the importance of looking at law from the outside. See Bok.
A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training. 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 570 (1983); Trubek, A
Strategy for Legal Studies: Getting Bok to Work, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 586 (1983).
Traditional legal research, often narrow and technical, studies problems as seen from the
inside. Until very recently, legal scholarship was defined as analytic work of this typte. It has been
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in the way of retraining or self-consciousness. Legal academics can use-
fully look at law from the viewpoint of an outside observer in general.
Because lawyers are not ordinarily trained to stand outside the legal
system (as we are not trained in many other things), it seems worth-
while to suggest that the deliberate adoption of the observer's role is a
readily available technique that can be used for contextual legal
scholarship.3
Far from its being impossible for us to identify with such a point
of view, it seems to me that lawyers adopt the observer's role more
often than we realize. Thus, when we as lawyers who are not compara-
tivists look at another legal system for the first time, even one very
close to our own, we do so with instructed but not altogether profes-
sional eyes. We look at that system without feeling part of it and are,
in this sense, observers in relation to that other system. I would like to
use, as two examples, approaches to the law of contemporary England
and nineteenth century America.
Let us start with the American lawyer looking at English law. An
American lawyer's conception of English law derives from and is illus-
trated by the fact that we conventionally speak of the Anglo-American
legal system, or Anglo-American law. These formulas assume that
there are important and even fundamental continuities between the En-
glish and American legal systems. We share a common legal culture, a
common past (up to a point), a common legal language, and "the com-
mon law. ''4
noted that:
legal scholarship is in many ways a bad joke [partly because of the] prevalence of pieces
like The Rule in Dumpor's Case in Kansas: Toothless Tiger or Trap for the Unwary
Draftsman? and the twin evil, the ringing of the most minute changes on major constitu-
tional cases such that the articles ought to be known not by author and title, but, like
prints in a series, by number-Stone v. Powell No. 617.
Konefsky & Shlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 848-49 (1982).
3. Lawyers whose work is formally comparative may have relevant skills, though even hero
there may be problems. See Renton, The Gods, the Judges, and the Laws, 9 KINGSTON L. REv. 3
(1979). "The difficulty is that Western commentators have a particular idea of law but they do
not understand that it is a particular idea." Id. at 31.
4. English cases, often venerable and sometimes involving obscure technologies and mind
sets-what is a carbolic smoke ball?, see Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1892] 2 Q.B. 484; a
bezar stone?, see Chandlor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac 4 (Ex. Ch. 1603); Llewellyn, On Warranty of
Quality and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699, 726 (1936)-are well known to American lawyers
from their time as students. Americans, at least, take "Anglo-American law" to be real, solid, and
whole. But perhaps not all Americans-note Llewellyn's comment that "England and any one of
the United States remain from 1800 to 1935 wholly separate historical problems," and regretting
the fact that the annotations in the Restatements were a-historical. Id. at 715-16.
[Vol. 16:1007
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Our preconception regarding the continuities between the two sys-
tems is largely validated by an initial exposure to English legal writing.
We read, confident on the whole of our understanding, until we encoun-
ter something in the text which, while not wrong, is not quite what we
would have said. In thinking about what we would have said, we dis-
cover that there is a significant difference (as important, one suspects,
as any similarity) between English and American legal materials, a dif-
ference that is more than the obvious structural distinction, for exam-
ple, between American casebooks and English textbooks. 5 Upon exami-
nation, this difference turns out to relate to the weight given by the two
systems to earlier decisions, in short, the weight attached to precedent
and the doctrine of stare decisis. For the American reader of English
materials, the English approach to precedent may be first revealed by
an English textbook that refers to old cases on the apparent assumption
that they are as good as ever.6 Such citations seem connected to the
fact that, until quite recently, the House of Lords could not overrule its
own decisions.3
The lawyer who sees this difference has noticed nothing new. Ar-
thur Goodhart, writing in 1930, suggested that the assumed bond be-
tween England and the United States, that is, the bond of the common
law, was a bond that was even then weakening. The English were, he
thought, remaining loyal to a quite strict approach to precedent, while
the Americans were much less committed to the idea that earlier cases
were determinative of present issues.8
5. The over-general statement would be to the effect that American law teachers use
casebooks (though textual presentations are also available, see. e.g., EA. FARNswoRTIt, CON-
TRAces (1982)), while the English use textbooks (though teaching materials based on cases and
questions are also available, see, e.g., J. SMITH & J. THomts, A CASEBOOK ON CONTRACrS (7th
ed. 1982)).
6. In 1982, Lord Diplock indicated that, in the public law context at least, only recent case
material should be cited. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. National Fed'n of Self Employed & Small
Businesses, Ltd., [1981] 2 All E.R. 93, 103.
7. Of course, a strict use of precedent does not mean that nothing can ever be changed. It may
mean that the system becomes adept at distinguishing cases. There have also been overt changes.
The House of Lords in 1966 said that it would no longer be bound by its own earlier ruling.
Practice Statement, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234. Glanville Williams quotes an English cartoon: "One
Law Lord to another: 'I say, Uptort, I can't get used to the fact that we can ever have been
wrong.'" G. WILuAM, LEARNING THE LAW 84-85 (1 lth ed. 1982).
For a discussion emphasizing a large change over time, see Atiyah, From Principles to Prog-
matism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L REv. 1249
(1980).
8. Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15 CORNELL LQ. 173 (1930). On the cita-
tion of "principles," see Gilmore, Legal RealisrL Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041-
42 (1961).
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Observing this English pattern, one reflects on the possibility that
the commitment to stability and rule is deep in the English culture,
found somehow in many English artifacts including the legal system.
John Stuart Mill noted that "[t]he English more than any other people
not only act but feel according to rule." He suggested that for the En-
glish, "rule has to a great degree substituted itself for nature," and that
in England, "[tihe greater part of life is carried on, not by following
inclination under the control of rule, but by having no inclination but
that of following a rule." 9 And Goodhart noted the connection between
the doctrine of precedent and larger cultural issues. The case system,
he thought, better satisfied the needs of England, where "conditions are
more or less static," while the system was "less suited to the United
States with its kaleidoscopic civilization." 10 He observed that "[t]he
rapidly changing social and economic conditions in the United States
place the rigidity of the case system under an unusual and heavy
strain."11 Underlying the particular doctrines of the English system,
then, are central values of continuity and order. 2 Change in such a
system might well carry a heavy burden of justification. And in
America, by contrast ...
Speculations about relationships between law and other parts of
the culture go on from there. The point is that, whether the generaliza-
tions are right or wrong, whether or not England is now or was ever
more stable than the United States, there is nothing "legal" in this
attempt to relate a legal fact to more general cultural attributes.
A similar phenomenon occurs when we look at nineteenth century
For a discussion of "the divergence in the two legal cultures," see Stevens, Two Cheers for
1870: The American Law School, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 465-70 (Fleming &
Bailyn eds. 1971). See generally Johnstone & Hopson, Lawyers and Their Work: An Analysis of
the Legal Profession, in ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1961).
One can imagine the reciprocal reaction triggered by a first exposure to the fact that the
American system permits a sequence of cases like the flag salute cases. See Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
See also Alder, The Westfarms Mall Case: An English View, 16 CONN. L. REv. 709 (1984),
suggesting that it is easy to overstate the differences between the two systems.
9. J. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869), reprinted in 21 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN
STUART MILL 313 (Robson ed. 1984).
10. Goodhart, supra note 8, at 189.
11. Id. at 188-89.
12. Cf Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). See generally Gower,
English Legal Training, 13 MOD. L. REv. 137, 174 (1950) (referring to the traditional disinterest
of English lawyers in law reform). But see R. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 288-91 (1982) (includ-
ing a discussion of possible additions to the list of implied terms in sales contracts).
[Vol. 16:1007
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American law.13 A professional and internal assumption of continuity
and substantial identity14 between the legal systems of nineteenth cen-
tury and present day America is modified if not defeated by observa-
tions that are not fundamentally linked to either professional skills or
internal perspectives. Often, when we read nineteenth century legal
materials, the sense that something is different relates to some very
general discussion of values, relating, for example, to gender roles,
marriage and the family,15 or religion.16 These discussions are impor-
tant signals as to something outside the legal system; they are keys to
larger questions of law and social context. Just as English doctrines of
precedent may be seen as relating to cultural characteristics, so judicial
discussions of gender may be seen as involving more than the sexism of
individual judges or even of judges as a class, and judicial reference to
the "truth" of Christianity17 may suggest something beyond the reli-
gious commitment of the individual judge. Thus, it was the outside ob-
server's understanding of the Girard Will case that Perry Miller in-
sisted on when he remarked that, while there were many issues in the
case, "the central question, as the populace knew and as Webster made
unmistakably plain, was that of the religiosity of the law."' 8
Recognition of the connection between the legal event and the un-
derlying assumptions of the legal system or indeed of the social order
13. One takes as given that to some extent the effort to understand the past must fail. As
Raymond Williams has noted, "the lived culture [contrasted with the recorded culture and the
culture of the selective tradition] in a particular time and place [is] only fully accessible to those
living in that time and place." R. WILUIAmS, THE LONG REVOLUTION 49 (1961). But less than
full access does not mean no access. Thus, Corbin's comment is useful:
In an ancient case, (Y.B. 17 Edw. IV, 2), Brian, CJ., remarked, perhaps erroneously,
that "the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man:' Every day experience shows
that man himself believes that he can discover the thoughts of another man. This he does
by inferences from the other's external expressions, in words, in features, and in acts.
Such evidence may indeed lead to woeful error, but it is the best we have and we act
upon it daily.
A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcTs 540 n.5 (one vol. ed. 1952).
14. See Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017, 1052 (1981).
15. See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J,
concurring).
16. 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 412-23 (12th ed. 1866).
17. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844) (Story, J.) (discussing the
relationship between Christianity and the common law).
18. P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND'S AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THIE CIVIL
WAR 199 (1965).
The will contained a provision barring clergymen from Girard College. Daniel Webster, rep-
resenting the heirs, argued that the devise was invalid. His speech was published under the title
"A Defense of the Christian Religion, and of the Religious Instruction of the Young" (N.Y.
1844).
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has no necessary relation to the package of organizational and analyti-
cal skills usually called "thinking like a lawyer." But then, thinking
like a lawyer, in the narrow sense, is simply one more thing we know
how to do. Viewed this way, one may suggest that for legal academics
looking at historical, comparative, or current legal materials,10 a serious
part of the task involves thinking quite consciously like an observer
rather than a participant in order to break down professional assump-
tions about what things mean and why they are important. 20
In Unequal Justice, Jerrold Auerbach, writing as a professional
historian, emphasized the significant strengths of the layman's outside
perspective. To begin with, he said, laymen are clearly able to "under-
stand how lawyers have responded in their professional capacity to pub-
lic issues. ' '21 Further, Auerbach wrote, "laymen must insist-until law-
19. Llewellyn invoked the Man from Mars and the New Adam as observers when he wrote on
the American Constitution. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLuM. L. Rav. 1,
3 (1934).
20. See Arthur Leff's comments on "metaphoric reasoning," a mode which "cuts across, in-
deed rolls right over, the subtleties of ratio decidendi." Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1007
n.45 (1978).
The lawyer's view of what is important in or about law can be very limited. As Willard Hurst
noted:
Anglo-American law men are by tradition and training biased toward equating law with
what judges do, to the neglect not only of legislative, executive, and administrative activ-
ity, but also to the neglect even of the out-of-court impact of the work of lawyers, let
alone the additions or subtractions made in legal order by lay attitudes and practices
affecting legal norms.
Hurst, The Law in United States History, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
3, 6 (L.M. Friedman & H.N. Scheiber eds. 1978).
One of the important things an outside observer tends to know is that state law is not the only
sanctioning system affecting individuals.
21. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 8 (1976).
It seems clear that, as professionals in law, we have a certain stake in maintaining that, as
was once said, "the subject matter of law is somewhat transcendent, and too high for ordinary
capacities." L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 2 (1967) (quoting the writer of Sheppard's Touchstone).
See also I DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267 (Reeve trans. 1966) (Unlike the
French lawyer, "the English and American lawyer resembles the hierophants of Egypt, for like
them he is the sole interpreter of an occult science.").
Still, certain fundamental ideas are entirely available as an intellectual matter to people who
do not stand within the legal profession. Human beings look at law in their environment all the
time, and they know it, however imperfectly and non-technically. Consider the descriptions of
precedent (English and American) offered by the satirists, Swift and Bierce. When Jonathan
Swift attacked precedent, he thought in terms of a system that perpetuated injustices that had
been once approved by law. Thus the familiar passage in Gulliver's Travels:
It is a maxim among these lawyers that whatever has been done before may legally be
done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made
against common justice, and the general reason of mankind. These, under the name of
precedents they produce as authorities. ...
. [Vol. 16:1007
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yers venture from their professional cocoon-that the law is social not
scientific; that legal history is a chapter of social history, not a self-
contained entity ... 22 As Auerbach's comment makes plain, lawyers
are not, by virtue of their training, disqualified from this enterprise.
Rather, an aspect of the famous legal omnicompetence may well in-
volve an ability to put aside one's training, at least to the extent that it
purports to define the subject, and to stand outside one's discipline.
J. SwIFr, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 266 (1726). See Dicey's response in A. DiCEY, LAW AND PUBuC
OPINIoN 366-67 (1926).
By contrast, when the American Ambrose Bierce attacked, the point was that the doctrine of
precedent, of unknown content in any event, simply masked judicial arbitrariness. Thus, in The
Devil's Dictionary, Bierce defined precedent as a "previous decision, rule or practice which, in the
absence of a definite statute, has whatever force and authority a judge may choose to give it,
thereby greatly simplifying his task of doing as he pleases ... ." A. BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DIc-
TIONARY, in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF AMBROSE BIERCE 330 (C. Fadiman ed. 1960). And in
response to the question, "What is precedent?": "It has been defined by five hundred lawyers in
three volumes each. So how can anyone know?" Id. at 235.
David Riesman suggested that ethnocentric legal training "may lead the lawyer to overlook
the possibility that the use of precedent is not merely a legal game played in America but not in
France but is actually a human characteristic to be looked for everywhere." Riesman, Toward an
Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession. 57 ANLt. J  Soc. 121 (1951).
The view of law held by non-lawyers includes much more "law" than the media version of a
criminal trial. Laymen's sense of details of the law can be acute when they are themselves in-
volved or when the topic is current. Further, the lay point of view may tell us something even
when we, as professionals, believe that there is something in the account that inadequately appre-
ciates the law's perspective. Consider the remarks of Bertrand Russell:
In America,. . . though it is not illegal to keep a mistress, it is illegal to travel with her
from one State to another, a New Yorker may take his mistress to Brooklyn but not to
Jersey City. The difference of moral turpitude between these two actions is not obvious to
the plain man.
B. RUSSELL, The Recrudescence of Puritanism, in SKEPTICAL ESSAYS 129 (1928). An American
lawyer may try to formulate an answer to Russell. Such response would not so much deny the
description as it would try to explain some legal consequences of "Our Federalism:' See Soifer &
Macgill, The Younger Doctrine" Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L REv. 1141 (1977).
But there remains a level-having, I suppose, to do with the phrase "In America"-at which the
point is still there, unanswered.
While it is true that certain questions can be raised and perhaps clarified by a researcher with
some appreciation of possible technical problems (e.g., it might have been illegal somewhere in
America to keep a mistress, especially if one were already married), it also seems possible that the
contribution that lawyers make to interdisciplinary conversation lies not so much in the fact that
they think like lawyers as in the fact that they understand, better than non-lawyers of any kind,
how lawyers think. Lawyers can, in short, act as translators between the disciplines. For a discus-
sion of lawyers and philosophers on promising, see Atiyah, Promises and the Law of Contract. 88
MIND 410 (1979). And see J.F. Stephen on lawyers and doctors on questions of the insanity
defense. 2 J. F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 124-86 (1883).
22. J. AUERBACH, supra note 21, at 8. It is often remarked that the English language uses the
term "non-lawyer" but does not use, for example, the term "non-historian." This does not mean,
however, that we lack the concept "professional historian." See J. HEXTER, DOING HIsTORY
(1971).
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This discussion has made only one point. It is that adopting the
observer's role is one way to place law in context. This outside point of
view-which may be finally identical to that of the lawyer "in its larg-
est sense" 3--helps us to raise and answer such questions as: Who are
these people?24 Is this important? What is this rule doing? It is the
outsider's view that we are using (and looking for) when we, as re-
searchers, go to sources far beyond the legal system to see how a legal
event is understood or was understood in its own time.25 It is the
outside point of view that we are using when we focus on the broad
rhetoric-"mere dictum"-of a judicial opinion as communicating
something important exactly because it is that language that is most
generally comprehensible. And as to the famous comment of Thomas
Reed Powell-"If you can think about something connected to some-
thing else without thinking about the thing it is connected to, then you
have the legal mind" 26-one may suggest that perhaps, for legal aca-
demics at least, the operative word is can.
23. Harold Berman quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes speaking to law students: "Your business
as lawyers is to see the relation between your particular fact and the whole frame of the universe."
H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION at vii
(1983).
24. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS & MASKS OF THE LAW (1976).
25. If we have seen a profound shift in orientation between the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies on a question such as the efficacy of religious sanctions, this shift would be most obviously
important to law itself in any area in which an "original understanding" was understood to mat-
ter. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204
(1980); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Prin-
ciples, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). For contextual work, these issues are important more gener-
ally. If underlying ideas about the reality are different, legal statements in many contexts would
have different meanings. For example, the reference to the forum of conscience in Mills v. Wy-
man, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825), might be read quite differently in religious and non-religious
contexts.
26. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 4 (1964) (quoting T.R. Powell).
(Vol. 16:1007
